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When applying for a patent, applicants must provide the examiner with
all known material prior art. Those who fail to do so can be charged
with inequitable conduct. But applicants can still effectively hide mate-
rial prior art references by submitting them along with large quantities
of immaterial prior art to the examiner This deceptive practice, known
as "burying," is generally not considered inequitable conduct. This Es-
say summarizes the current legal landscape concerning burying,
discusses the costs associated with the practice, and suggests ways to
deter and punish those who do it.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent applicants must disclose all known material prior art to the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").' Those who fail to do so may find
their patent unenforceable under the controversial inequitable conduct doc-
trine.2 Although the doctrine has received significant attention, including
numerous Federal Circuit decisions and law review articles, 3 one important
practice generally is not considered inequitable conduct: "burying" prior art.
An applicant buries material prior art and reduces the likelihood that a
USPTO examiner will read it by disclosing it with large quantities of imma-
terial prior art. For example, one applicant disclosed a highly relevant
reference with nearly six hundred other references without identifying what
was relevant or why.4
The design of the current inequitable conduct doctrine makes it ineffec-
tive against burying. The doctrine generally only punishes applicants who
fail to disclose known material prior art, incentivizing excessive disclosures
and providing a pretext to bury.5 The USPTO similarly has almost no regula-
tions to discourage burying.6 Congress also has not addressed the issue
directly.7 Applicants are left with a means of hiding prior art while still dis-
closing it to the examiner.
1. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012).
2. The inequitable conduct inquiry balances the materiality of the prior art with the
applicant's apparent intent to deceive the USPTO. If inequitable conduct is found, the entire
patent can be held unenforceable. See infra Part I.B.
3. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc); Margaret A. Boulware & Tamsen Valoir, Inequitable Conduct, 691 PLI/PAT.
1245, 1251 (2000). For commentary on the doctrine, see Christopher A. Cotropia, Moderniz-
ing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723 (2009);
Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable
Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329 (2009); James Cronin, Comment, Inequitable Con-
duct and the Standard of Materiality: Why the Federal Circuit Should Use the Reasonable
Patent Examiner Standard, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1327 (2006); Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming
Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 147 (2006); Elizabeth Peters, Note, Are We Living in a Material World?: An Analy-
sis of the Federal Circuit's Materiality Standard Under the Patent Doctrine of Inequitable
Conduct, 93 lowA L. REV. 1519 (2008).
4. CIVIX-DDI, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 711 F. Supp. 2d 839, 848-49 (N.D. Ill.
2010).
5. See infra Part IlI.B.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. Congress recently passed the America Invents Act ("AIA"), which provides for
post-grant review of patents. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-29 (2011). The AIA does not directly
address burying or inequitable conduct, but it does provide for a procedure known as "sup-
plemental examination" which allows applicants to "cure" previous inequitable conduct before
the USPTO in some instances. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO
Publishes Final Rules for Supplemental Examination and Inventor's Oath or Declaration (Aug.
13,2012), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-51.jsp ("A patent owner may use supple-
mental examination to forestall a subsequent inequitable conduct challenge to the
enforceability of the patent during litigation.").
Burying comes with significant costs. It unnecessarily burdens the
USPTO, increases the length of patent litigation, and hinders innovation.
This Essay discusses these problems and proposes ways to deter and punish
the practice. Part I explores the light treatment the USPTO and courts have
given burying. Part II discusses the problems the practice creates. Part M
proposes changes to the USPTO rules and inequitable conduct doctrine to
deter and punish the practice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Office Rules
Applicants have a duty of candor before the USPTO that includes dis-
closing all known material prior art.8 Compliance can be challenging,
however, as the definition of material is subject to change. In 1977, the
USPTO ruled that a reference was material when there was "a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in decid-
ing whether to allow the application to issue as a patent."9 The USPTO
subsequently updated the definition, and today a reference is material if it
either "establish[es] .. . a prima facie case of unpatentability" or is incon-
sistent with an argument for the patentability of the application. o Although
the stated purpose of the change" was to clarify the old rule, 2 the USPTO
still acknowledges the confusion with the standard and suggests that appli-
cants submit prior art whenever there is any concern about materiality.13 The
8. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012).
9. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991).
10. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2012).
I1. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021-02 cmt. 4 (proposed Jan. 17, 1992) (codified
at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10) ("The Office does not anticipate any significant change in the quantity
of information cited to the Office after promulgation of amended § 1.56."); id. cmt. 22 ("The
definition of materiality in § 1.56 does not impose substantial new burdens on applicants
12. MPEP § 2001.04 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) ("The amendment to ... 1.56
address[es] criticism concerning a perceived lack of certainty in the materiality standard. ...
[The rule has been] amended to present a clearer and more objective definition of what infor-
mation the Office considers material to patentability."); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg.
2021-02 cmt. I (proposed Jan. 17, 1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 10) ("The rule as prom-
ulgated will provide greater clarity and hopefully minimize the burden of litigation on the
question of inequitable conduct before the Office . . . ."); id. cmt. 10 ("Section 1.56 has been
amended to present a clearer and more objective definition of what information the Office
considers material to patentability.").
13. MPEP § 2004.10 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) ("When in doubt, it is desirable and
safest to submit information. Even [if the applicant] doesn't consider it necessarily material,
someone else may see it differently . . .. ") (emphasis added); see also id. § 2001.04 ("An in-
centive remains to submit the information to the Office because it will result in a strengthened
patent and will avoid later questions of materiality and intent to deceive. . . . [T]he new rules
will actually facilitate the filing of information .... "). The USPTO perhaps appropriately
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USPTO is essentially encouraging overdisclosure in the wake of uncertainty,
providing applicants with a pretext to bury.
While the USPTO has made some attempts to curb overdisclosure,
these efforts have been largely ineffective. For example, the USPTO specifi-
cally advises against long lists of references and suggests highlighting
important references.' 4 The USPTO also suggests applicants keep a record
of the prior art they believe to be immaterial, along with the reasons why.'5
Applicants will be unlikely to heed such suggestions, however, if doing so
makes them more vulnerable to inequitable conduct charges based on non-
disclosure.1'
Applicants must also make a reasonable inquiry as to whether the in-
formation they wish to submit supports their arguments for patentability and
will not needlessly burden the USPTO.'" In 2008, the USPTO's Discipline
Director stated that this rule requires applicants to have read the reference
they intend to submit to the USPTO.'8 But requiring applicants merely to
read the reference is not particularly effective, as applicants presumably at
least skim the references they intend to submit already.'9 Although the
USPTO does have a more substantive rule requiring applicants to provide a
concise explanation of the prior art's relevance to the patent application, this
requirement only applies to foreign language references.20 For references in
appears to value the possibility of extra information more highly than reducing its own work-
load.
14. Id. § 2004.13 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) ("It is desirable to avoid the submission of
long lists of documents if it can be avoided. Eliminate clearly irrelevant and marginally perti-
nent cumulative information. If a long list is submitted, highlight those documents which have
been specifically brought to applicant's attention and/or are known to be of most signifi-
cance.").
15. Id. § 2004.18 ("[1]f information was specifically considered and discarded as not
material, this fact might be recorded in an attorney's file or applicant's file, including the rea-
son for discarding it. If judgment might have been bad or something might have been
overlooked inadvertently, a note made at the time of evaluation might be an invaluable aid in
explaining that the mistake was honest and excusable. Though such records are not required,
they could be helpful in recalling and explaining actions in the event of a question of 'fraud'
or 'inequitable conduct' raised at a later time.").
16. Cf Russell Magaziner, The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's Proposed Infor-
mation Disclosure Statement Rules: Too Novel and Nonobvious, 83 IND. L.J. 719, 731 (2008).
17. 37 C.F.R. § l.18(b)(2) (2012).
18. See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Patent Practitioner Ethics Update, PATENT-
LY-O.coM (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/12/patent-practiti.html.
Some commentators have interpreted the provision similarly. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 3,
at 777-78.
19. Presumably there is a minimal threshold of reading required to know the reference
is somehow related to the patent application.
20. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(a)(3)(i) (2012); see also MPEP § 609.04(a)(Ill) (8th ed. Rev. 9,
Aug. 2012) ("If a complete translation of the information into English is submitted with the
non-English language information, no concise explanation is required."). Rule 1.98's require-
ment is a weak one, however, as even the abstract of the document, if it is in English, is
acceptable-no further explanation of relevance is required. See MPEP § 609.04(a)(lll)
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English, an explanation of relevance is encouraged but not required. 21 These
rules do little to deter overdisclosure or burying.
To alleviate the overdisclosure concern, the USPTO proposed changes
to how applicants submit Information Disclosure Statements ("IDS").22 An
IDS is a form that patent applicants use to provide the examiner with rele-
vant prior art references. 23 The suggested changes were intended to
discourage applicants from submitting excessive references.24 Under the
proposed rules, if a disclosure were made before the first office action or
three months from filing, and more than twenty references were submitted,
then the applicant would have to specifically identify which parts of each
reference justified its inclusion in the IDS. 25 If the disclosure were made
after this first period but before allowance by the USPTO, then the applicant
would also have to explain why the new references were not cumulative
over previously disclosed references.26 Finally, if the disclosure were made
after allowance but before issue, the applicant additionally would have to
explain why the submitted references did not invalidate the independent
claims of the patent application.27 The amount of work these rules would
have entailed for certain types of disclosures may have prevented most ap-
plicants from burying-not only because of the paperwork required but also
because of their inability to provide an adequate explanation for submitting
so much immaterial prior art. The time-based requirement also targets po-
tentially deceptive last-minute disclosures. 28 Unfortunately, these rules were
("Submission of an English language abstract of a reference may fulfill the requirement for a
concise explanation.").
21. Id. ("[Though not required,] applicants are encouraged to provide a concise expla-
nation of why the English-language information is being submitted and how it is understood
to be relevant. Concise explanations .. . are helpful to the Office, particularly where docu-
ments are lengthy and complex . . . .").
22. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38808-01 (proposed July 10, 2006).
23. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97, 1.98 (2012); see also Changes To Information Disclosure
Statement Requirements and Other Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38808-01, 38809 (proposed
July 10, 2006) (noting sections 1.97 and 1.98 provide "a mechanism by which patent appli-
cants may comply with the duty of disclosure provided in § 1.56"); MPEP § 609 (8th ed. Rev.
9, Aug. 2012).
24. See Magaziner, supra note 16, at 729; see also Lisa A. Dolak, Beware the Inequita-
ble Conduct Charge! (Why Practitioners Submit What They Submit), 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 558, 567-68 (2009).
25. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related
Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38808-01 (proposed July 10, 2006). If fewer than twenty references
were submitted, but a given document was over twenty-five pages in length or in a foreign
language, and the other conditions were met, then the rule still applied to those references. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See discussion infra Part Ill.A.
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never implemented.2 9 Because these rules were never enacted, applicants
still have freedom to bury references.
Without strong USPTO rules to deter burying, courts hold the burden of
addressing deceptive overdisclosure. While some courts do recognize the
problem, they are doing very little to deter the practice.
B. Caselaw
1. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine
Burying allegations are made under the inequitable conduct doctrine.
Inequitable conduct is invoked by an alleged infringer in a patent infringe-
ment action based on a patent applicant's unfair conduct before the USPTO.
A finding of inequitable conduct may render the patent unenforceable. 30
Because of these harsh consequences, a litigant alleging inequitable conduct
based on nondisclosure of prior art known to the applicant must demonstrate
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the prior art was material and (2)
the applicant intended to deceive the USPTO.31 In the past, a weak showing
for one prong could be balanced by a strong showing for the other,32 but
today "[i]ntent and materiality are separate requirements."33 If both prongs
are met, the court will determine whether equitable considerations warrant
finding the patent unenforceable. 34
The Federal Circuit in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.
ruled that the materiality of a reference is determined by a but-for stand-
ard." That is, "prior art is but-for material if the [US]PTO would not have
allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art."3 And be-
cause the USPTO only applies a preponderance of the evidence standard in
determining whether a patent should be issued in light of the prior art, a
court assessing inequitable conduct need only determine that it is more like-
29. One reason the proposed changes to the IDSs were never implemented may have
been a change in administration. Cf Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, PTO to Delay IDS &
Markush Rules Until 2009, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:20 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2008/10/pto-to-delay-id.html; see also infra Part III.A (discussing how related pro-
posals might be used to deter burying).
30. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285, 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
31. Id. at 1304.
32. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (citing Monsanto Co. v. Bayer BioScience N.Y., 363 F.3d 1235, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
For a prescient suggestion that the two prongs should not be balanced, see Cotropia, supra
note 3, at 775-77.
33. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
34. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367.
35. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
36. Id. at 1291. An exception exists for when the otherwise material reference is cumu-
lative to existing material references. See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d
1316, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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ly than not that the absent prior art would have rendered the claims un-
patentable before the USPTO.37 Although the court did not explicitly state
whether it was raising the bar for materiality,38 it did resolve confusion over
which materiality standard should apply.39
To satisfy the intent prong, an accused infringer must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the applicant "knew of the reference, knew that it
was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it."40 Although
intent can be inferred in limited circumstances, 4 1 it frequently will be diffi-
cult to prove because there is rarely a "smoking gun." 42 These evidentiary
issues also apply to proving intent to bury.
37. MPEP § 706 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012). Note that this is a lower burden of proof
than what courts use to invalidate a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 282, which is a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242
(2011).
38. It appears that the court did: "In the past, this court has tried to address the prolifer-
ation of inequitable conduct charges by raising the intent standard alone .... This higher
intent standard, standing alone, did not reduce the number of inequitable conduct cases before
the courts and did not cure the problem of overdisclosure of marginally relevant prior art to the
PTO. To address these concerns, this court adjusts as well the standard for materiality." The-
rasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
39. In the past, five different standards of materiality have been used. See Thomas Cot-
ter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIz. L. REV.
735, 743-44 (2011). The first two materiality standards originated with the USPTO and are
discussed in Part 1: the pre-1992 standard, where a "reasonable examiner would consider [the
reference] important," 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991), and the post-1992 standard, where the infor-
mation "establishes a prima facie case of unpatentability" or "refutes or is inconsistent" with
positions taken by the applicant. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1992). The three other tests that have
been used include (1) the objective but-for test (the misrepresented prior art should have pre-
vented the patent from issuing), (2) a subjective but-for test (the particular examiner would not
have issued the patent but for the misrepresentation), and (3) a but-it-may-have test where a
reference could be material if it might have influenced the examiner's decision. See Cotter,
supra, at 744; Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1039, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (reviewing the materiality standards). The test today appears to be a hybrid of the objec-
tive and subjective "but-for" tests. Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315-16 (reviewing the
materiality standards).
40. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
41. See id.; Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2008). But see Magaziner, supra note 16, at 727 ("The level of actual intent may be
extremely low . . . ."). The court can also infer intent if the applicant "should have known" the
reference was highly material. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("[A] patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it knew or should
have known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish 'subjective good
faith' sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to mislead." (quoting Critikon,
Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
42. See Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he facts in inequitable conduct cases rarely, if ever, include direct evi-
dence of admitted deceitful conduct.").
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2. Appellate Caselaw on Burying
Appellate caselaw does not provide a definite answer as to whether bur-
ying is a form of inequitable conduct. One of the most favorable cases for
treating burying as inequitable conduct predates the Federal Circuit.4 3 In
Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., the Fifth Circuit upheld a lower
court's decision that rendered a patent unenforceable for burying." The ap-
plicant submitted a particularly relevant prior art patent with twelve other
less relevant patents. Although the other patents were all the result of a
pre-filing search, the important patent had issued after the filing date.4 5 The
applicant misleadingly stated in his submission that all of the patents were
the result of a pre-examination search.46 The district court found that the
applicant buried the important reference and, in part for this reason, held the
patent unenforceable.4 7 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.48
The Federal Circuit first substantively addressed burying in Molins PLC
v. Textron, Inc.49 In Molins, the original patent applicant failed to disclose a
material reference. A subsequent assignee of the patent submitted the mate-
rial reference to the USPTO after discovering that the original applicant
knew of the reference but failed to disclose it. The assignee, however, sub-
mitted the material reference with nearly one hundred other references.o
The district court held the patent unenforceable based on the timing and
method of disclosure.51 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. The court
43. The Federal Circuit, formed in 1982, has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals of district
court decisions in actions that arose under federal patent statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2011).
For a history of the creation of the court, see Paul M. Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long
Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (1887-1982), 69 ANTITRUST
L.J. 645 (2002).
44. Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam).
45. Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948, 964-65 (D. Fla.
1972).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 965
48. Penn Yan, 479 F.2d 1328.
49. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184-86 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Molins is not
the first Federal Circuit decision on burying, but it appears to provide the first real discussion
of the practice. For example, the year before Molins, the Federal Circuit affirmed, without
publishing an opinion, a lower court decision finding inequitable conduct in part because the
applicant engaged in burying. See Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn
Co., 837 F. Supp. 1444, 1453-64 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff'd, I F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Some
years prior to Golden Valley, the Federal Circuit in an unpublished table decision found ineq-
uitable conduct where an applicant had failed to disclose a reference and both "buried" and
mischaracterized another reference. Donaldson Co. v. Pneumafil Corp., 824 F.2d 979 (Fed.
Cir. 1987). In Donaldson the court's focus was on the nondisclosure of one reference and the
misleading characterization of the other reference, rather than the other reference being "bur-
ied" per se. Id.
50. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1183.
51. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1551, 1572 (D. Del. 1992) ("[The mate-
rial reference] was initially withheld and later disclosed with a large number of other allegedly
noted that burying can be "probative of bad faith"5 2 and found that the sub-
sequent patent owner had attempted to "repair" the situation by submitting
the art. Thus, the court did not find clear and convincing evidence of an in-
tent to deceive.53 The court also distinguished the case from Penn Yan,
noting that the references in Penn Yan were not only buried but also mis-
characterized. 54
Despite the suggestion that burying could be "probative of bad faith,"
other parts of Molins, as well as other Federal Circuit decisions, could be
interpreted to mean that burying cannot be inequitable conduct. In a subse-
quent discussion of inequitable conduct that did not involve burying, the
Molins court cited Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.
for the proposition that "[w]hen a reference was before the examiner,
whether through the examiner's search or the applicant's disclosure, it can-
not be deemed to have been withheld from the examiner."" Subsequent
cases, such as Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.5 6 and Fiskars, Inc. v.
Hunt Manufacturing Co.57 also cite to the same language from Scripps. One
potential implication of this language is that because a buried reference is
technically "before the examiner," it is not "withheld" and cannot be a basis
for inequitable conduct.5 1
The Scripps, Litton, and Fiskars Federal Circuit decisions do not neces-
sarily preclude burying from being a form of inequitable conduct as they did
prior art references. Failing to highlight the [material reference] in light of [patentee's]
knowledge regarding [applicant's] actions in the foreign prosecutions, violated the duty of
candor owed to the U.S. PTO." (citing Penn Yan, 359 F. Supp. at 964-65)).
52. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1184.
53. Id. Judge Nies dissented, arguing that the patentee could not have possibly "re-
paired" the situation by burying the reference. See id. at 1188-90 (Nies, J., dissenting). Judge
Nies had a good point-the Federal Circuit had a standard for correcting prior misrepresenta-
tions, and the patentee in Molins almost certainly did not meet it. See Rohm & Haas Co. v.
Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("It does not suffice that one know-
ing of misrepresentations in an application or in its prosecution merely supplies the examiner
with accurate facts without calling his attention to the untrue or misleading assertions sought
to be overcome, leaving him to formulate his own conclusions."). Despite this, Federal Circuit
decisions continue to find that submitting buried information to "fix" earlier disclosure prob-
lems is evidence of good, not bad, faith. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm.,
Inc., 377 Fed. App'x 978, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Specifically, the fact that the applicants later
submitted to the PTO the [buried references] strongly suggests that the applicants did not act
with deceptive intent ... ").
54. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1183.
55. Id. at 1185 (citing Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566
F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
56. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacated
on other grounds, 520 U.S. III I(1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded, 140 F.3d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
57. Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
58. Some district courts have adopted this interpretation, as discussed later in this sec-
tion.
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not address the burying issue directly. In Scripps, the reference had not been
disclosed and instead was discovered by the patent examiner "on his own."5 9
In Litton, the patent applicant originally withheld the reference but later
disclosed it during reissue.' In Fiskars, the applicant disclosed a brochure
describing what he considered to be the closest prior art to his invention, but
the examiner indicated that the brochure had not been considered.6' The
Federal Circuit consequently found no inequitable conduct because the bro-
chure was before the examiner.62 None of these decisions speak directly to
burying, and none necessarily preclude the practice from being a form of
inequitable conduct.
Recent decisions from the Federal Circuit increasingly recognize the
problems of burying but stop short of considering it inequitable conduct. In
Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co., the Fed-
eral Circuit found that submitting a reference in a foreign language, along
with a partially translated version of the reference that directed the examiner
away from material information, amounted to "constructively
with[holding]" the reference.6 3 The defendants in the case argued that
providing this partial translation, along with an untranslated version of the
full document and ninety other references as prior art, was a form of bury-
ing, citing Molins.6r Although the Federal Circuit did not address this
specific burying argument, the overall finding that a reference before the
examiner could nonetheless be constructively withheld is promising for the
burying defense.65 Subsequently, in eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTech USA, L.L.C.,
59. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1582.
60. The lower court in Litton separately addressed a burying argument but found that
submitting a list of eighty two undifferentiated references, by itself, did not amount to
inequitable conduct. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., CV 90-93 MRP, CV 90-4823, 1995
WL 366468, at *37 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1995) (citing Golden Valley and Penn Yan, discussed
supra). The Federal Circuit decision did not address this specific argument. The decision coin-
cidentally refers to the burying of a cumulative reference in a footnote of a patentability
report, Litton, 87 F.3d at 1570, which is not the conduct covered in this Essay.
61. Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1326-27.
62. Id. at 1327-28 ("Fiskars' citation as prior art defeats Hunt's charge that the Maru-
zen device was withheld with deceptive intent .... An applicant's citation of prior art in
accordance with the rules of the PTO precludes a finding of withholding of that prior art with
deceptive intent.").
63. Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
64. Brief for Defendants-Cross Appellants at 21 n.2, Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Nos. 98-1377, 99-1103) (citing Molins
PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
65. Semiconductor Energy Lab., 204 F.3d at 1378. In particular, during later litigation
between the same parties, Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
749 F. Supp. 2d 892 (W.D. Wis. 2010), the court stated:
I am not convinced that as a matter of law, the holdings in Fiskars and Scripps [sic]
preclude all inequitable conduct claims alleging the burying or concealing of a ref-
erence. In fact, in SEL II, 204 F.3d at 1376, the Federal Circuit found that plaintiff's
intent to deceive the patent office could be inferred from its disclosure of a partial
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the court cited Semiconductor Energy when it found inequitable conduct in
part because of the applicant's "blizzard of paper."66 In eSpeed, the entity
asserting the patent learned that important prior art known during the
application process had not been disclosed. To cure this problem, the entity
submitted declarations by the patent's inventors about the missing prior art.
The declarations and accompanying exhibits totaled over a thousand pages,
and certain of the submitted declarations contained deceptive statements.
The district court found that the "blizzard of paper" submitted by the appli-
cant was consistent with an intent to hide important information, and
together with the misleading statements "amply" supported a finding of in-
tent.67 The Federal Circuit upheld the district court's finding, noting both the
size of the disclosure and the deceptive statements made by the declarants. 8
Most recently, in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., an en
banc Federal Circuit noted that "patent prosecutors regularly bury PTO ex-
aminers with a deluge of prior art references, most of which have marginal
value,"69 and further recognized various amici briefs addressing this prac-
tice.70 The court went on to raise the standards for inequitable conduct. 71
Although the court recognized some of the problems associated with bury-
ing, it did not specifically state how or even if the new inequitable conduct
standard addressed burying. The court's discussion of the new materiality
standard also focused on "withheld" references, making it unclear that dis-
closed-but-buried references could be "material" under the new standard. 72
And although a broad exception to the but-for materiality standard was rec-
ognized for "affirmative egregious acts,"73 it appears that even obvious cases
of burying might not fall under this exception.7' The Therasense decision
translation of a Japanese reference, even though plaintiff had submitted a full, un-
translated version, because the partial translation omitted key teachings of the
reference that rendered the pending claims unpatentable.
Id. at 903.
66. eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec USA, L.L.C., 480 F.3d 1129, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
67. eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTech USA, L.L.C., 417 F. Supp. 2d 580,598 (D. Del. 2006).
68. eSpeed, 480 F.3d at 1137-38.
69. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed Cir. 2011).
70. Id. at 1289-90.
71. See, e.g., id. at 1289-90, 1291.
72. See, e.g., id. at 1291 ("When an applicant fails to disclose prior art to the PTO, that
prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the
undisclosed prior art. Hence, in assessing the materiality of a withheld reference, the court
must determine whether the PTO would have allowed the claim if it had been aware of the
undisclosed reference."); see also Ist Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("This court's recent opinion in Therasense changed the standard for proving
inequitable conduct based on nondisclosure of a reference to the PTO.").
73. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293.
74. The examples provided of falling within the "but for" standard, namely "filing of an
unmistakably false affidavit:' "manufacture of evidence," and "bribery," in combination with
the court's statement that "failure to mention prior art references," would not qualify as an
egregious act, seem to allow little room for burying in the exception. Id. at 1293, 1314.
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makes it far from clear whether the change in the inequitable conduct stand-
ard will have any real impact on burying.75
This mix of appellate law has led to divergent decisions in district
courts. Some have refused to consider burying at all. 76 In Symbol Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., for example, the court granted a motion to
strike a burying allegation.77 The court relied on Scripps and Fiskars in de-
ciding that an inequitable conduct allegation based on burying was
"insufficient as a matter of law."" Other district courts appear to recognize
the doctrine but find reasons not to apply it.79 For example, in Purdue Phar-
maceutical Products L.P. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. the court recognized
Molins's support for the burying defense, but found that providing summar-
ies of the submitted references was sufficient to overcome the burying
allegations.s0 Other courts have provided stronger support for the doctrine,
75. Preliminary commentary on the case suggests that it may backfire. See Zhe (Amy)
Peng et al., A Panacea for Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown Version 2.0? The
Therasense Decision and a Look into the Future of US. Patent Law Reform, 16 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 373, 390 (2011).
76. See, e.g., Symbol Techs. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358-59 (D.
Del. 2009); Haney v. Timesavers, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1378, 1380, 1382 (D. Or. 1995) ("The
court cannot infer an intent to deceive . . . from the manner in which the information was con-
veyed to the Patent Office when the information was, in fact, conveyed."); H.H. Robertson Co.
v. Barger Metal Fabricating Co., 225 U.S.P.Q. 1191, 1206 n.36 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("[T]he
Court will not infer that the patent examiner was unable to cope with 71 pages of paper-
work.").
77. Symbol Techs., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 358-59.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Human Genome Sci., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 2:1 1-cv-6519-MRP,
2011 WL 7461768, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (finding burying allegations were not suffi-
ciently pled); FURminator, Inc. v. Kim Laube & Co., 758 F. Supp. 2d 797, 831 (E.D. Mo.
2010) (rejecting burying allegation premised on applicant's failure to provide summaries of
submitted references); Humanscale Corp. v. CompX Int'l, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-86, 2010 WL
3222411, at *15-16 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2010) (no intent to deceive when International Search
Report marked a reference as particularly important, but applicant failed to identify reference
in subsequent IDS); Advanced Ion Beam Tech., Inc. v. Varian Semiconductor Equip. Assocs.,
721 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D. Mass. 2010) (recognizing the burying doctrine but finding that the
facts did not support a burying allegation); Kimberly-Clark Worldwide v. First Quality Baby
Prods., LLC, 714 F. Supp. 2d 919, 937 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (failure to highlight references was
not burying); Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc. v. AirSep Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 348, 460-61 (W.D. Pa.
2000) (recognizing the burying doctrine, but finding reference alleged to have been buried not
material); Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2d
508, 545-47 (D.N.J. 1999) (recognizing the burying doctrine, but finding no intent to bury);
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., No. CV 90-93 MRP, 1995 WL 366468, at *37-38 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 6, 1995) (recognizing the burying doctrine, but finding allegation insufficient because
patentee argued that he did not wish to mislead the examiner by emphasizing some references
over others), rev'd 87 F.3d 1559, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("An applicant cannot intentionally
withhold a reference actually considered by the PTO, even though the applicant may not have
disclosed the art."), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, vacated in part and remanded, 140 F.3d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) abrogated by Festo Corp.
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
80. Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 329, 377 (D. Del.
2009), aff 'd, 377 Fed. App'x 978 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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but only in the context of non-final case determinations.8 1 In Reid Ashman
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Swanson Semiconductor Service, LL.C., for exam-
ple, a magistrate judge refused to strike the burying defense. 82 Similarly, in
Synqor Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. the magistrate judge found that burying
could be the basis for an inequitable conduct allegation and denied a motion
to strike.83 Though decisions like Reid and Synqor recognize the doctrine,
these decisions concern pleadings as opposed to actual findings of inequita-
ble conduct.8
Further, only two International Trade Commission ("ITC") opinions
discuss burying.85 In Certain Digital Satellite System ("DSS") Receivers,86
the patentee submitted 253 references to the examiner in four disclosures.
The plaintiff argued there could not have been any meaningful review of the
references but the administrative law judge ("ALJ") disagreed, noting that
81. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 459, 463 (E.D. Va.
2011) (finding that deceptive intent based partly on burying, although "strained," was suffi-
cient for pleading under Rule 9(b)); Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby
Prods., LLC, No. 09-C-0916, 2010 WL 3386599, at *1-2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2010) (express-
ing doubt, but refusing to strike burying defense plead on unclean hands, as opposed to
inequitable conduct grounds); MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 732 E Supp. 2d 915, 918
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (recognizing burying doctrine in context of granting early hearing on inequi-
table conduct); CIVIX-DDI, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 711 F Supp. 2d 839, 848-49 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (granting motion to amend complaint to include burying allegation); Reid-Ashman
Mfg., Inc. v. Swanson Semiconductor Serv., LLC, No. C-06-4693 JCS, 2007 WL 1394427, at
*6--7 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2007) (refusing to strike inequitable conduct defense based on bury-
ing); Dri Mark Prods., Inc. v. Wilpak Indus., Inc., No. 04-CV-696 (JBW), 2006 WL 2882565,
at *1, *14 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2006) (relying in part on burying to deny motion to set aside
magistrate judge's recommendation for summary judgment); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover
Serv. Ctr., 765 E Supp. 1129, 1137-38 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding plaintiff did not demonstrate
reasonable likelihood that inequitable conduct defense would fail on motion for preliminary
injunction, where patentee had submitted forty-one references to the USPTO and arguably
mischaracterized one of the material references submitted).
82. Reid-Ashman, 2007 WL 1394427, at *6-7.
83. Synqor, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. I 1-cv-54, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129463 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 7, 2012). Magistrate Judge Craven provides an excellent overview of the caselaw on
the subject, and her report was adopted by the district judge. Synqor, Inc. v. Cisco Systems,
Inc., No. I 1-cv-54, 2012 WL 3984865 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2012).
84. Indeed, in Synqor the magistrate judge specifically noted that the burying allegation
in that case was sufficient to survive a motion to strike but "may not be enough to satisfy the
Therasense elements by clear and convincing evidence." Synqor, No. 1 1-cv-54. 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 129463, at *23 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2012).
85. The ITC is an Article I administrative body with the power to investigate imports
that allegedly infringe intellectual property rights. The ITC can issue exclusion orders that
prevent the importation of products found to infringe a patent. It can also render a patent unen-
forceable for inequitable conduct. While the decision will only apply within the ITC, Article
III courts may still consider such decisions persuasive. See Tandon Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 851 E2d 342, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Corning Glass Works v. U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1570 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
86. Certain Digital Satellite System ("DSS") Receivers, Inv. No. 337-TA-392, USITC
Pub. 3418, at 14 (Oct. 20, 1997) (initial determination), available at 1997 WL 696255.
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the "applicants presented a detailed reference category list"87 and, citing
Molins, presumed the examiner considered the reference.88 In Certain Cold
Cathode Fluorescent Lamp ("CCFL") Inverter Circuits, the applicant
submitted "over 500 documents" spanning "thousands of pages."89 But be-
cause the material references were in the first few pages of the information
disclosure statement and the references had been separately identified in the
transmittal letter, the AU did not find clear and convincing evidence of in-
tent to deceive. 90 The AU also noted that the examiner commented on some
of the references in the disclosure, and, citing Molins, stated that "absent
proof to the contrary, it is assumed that the examiner did consider the refer-
ences," including the allegedly buried ones.91 Thus although the ITC has
been willing to consider the defense, no ITC case has explicitly rendered a
patent unenforceable because of burying.
C. Applicant Incentives to Bury
This ambivalent legal treatment encourages applicants to bury material
prior art. Consider a situation where a patent applicant knows of prior art that
would likely preclude the desired claims. In an effort to obtain the patent, the
applicant has three options: (1) disclose the art and attempt to distinguish it,
(2) withhold the art, or (3) disclose the art deceptively by burying it.92 The first
option would either likely lead to no patent or, if the practitioner wrote claims
around the prior art, a patent of diminished value to the applicant. Thus, if the
applicant wants a patent with the full scope of the original claims, there are
strong incentives either to withhold the prior art or bury it.
Compared to withholding prior art, burying would likely provide better
outcomes for the applicant post-issuance. By actually disclosing the refer-
ences, the applicant reduces significantly the threat of an inequitable
conduct finding.93 In addition, because the patent examiner "considered" the
prior art as a matter of law, it will receive less weight as an invalidating
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Certain Cold Cathode Fluorescent Lamp ("CCFL") Inverter Circuits, Inv. No. 337-
TA-666, USITC Pub. 4269, at 92 (Apr. 19, 2010) (initial determination), available at 2010
WL 1918549.
90. Id. at 91.
91. Id. at 93.
92. Cf Cotropia, supra note 3, at 762-67 (discussing perverse incentives created by
inequitable conduct claims generally). An applicant might also have incentives not to search
for prior art at all, see, e.g., Bhaven Sampat, When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art?, 53 J.
L. & ECON. 399, 400-01 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's
Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1086 (2003); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk
Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005-06), but they are less relevant to the
burying discussion. In addition, separate incentives to search for prior art may be stronger. See
infra note 94.
93. Cotropia, supra note 3, at 761-70.
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reference in subsequent litigation.94 In such cases the applicant not only has
a patent with full claims, but also an application filled with a large cache of
prior art, reducing the chances of a successful invalidity attack in litigation.
On the other hand, pre-issuance considerations between the options of
withholding and burying are arguably similar and unlikely to lead an appli-
cant to choose one over the other. Examiners are very pressed for time, and
although they are presumed to have read all the references within the appli-
cation they simply will not be able to review a large number of references as
closely as a small disclosure due to time constraints." In addition,
94. Though the standard is the same for prior art whether or not it was cited in the ap-
plication, the fact that the USPTO had considered the reference can be taken into account. See
Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chemical Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("When no prior art other than that which was considered by the PTO examiner is relied on by
the attacker, he has the added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified
government agency presumed to have properly done its job, which includes one or more
examiners who are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the references and to be
familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only
valid patents." (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 1984))); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.,
976 F.2d 1559, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Where the PTO has considered a piece of prior art,
and issued a patent notwithstanding that prior art, a court owes some deference to the PTO's
decision."); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("This burden is especially difficult when the prior art was before the PTO examiner
during prosecution of the patent."); Sampat, supra note 92, at 415 (discussing incentives creat-
ed as a result). In addition, studies suggest that in practice prior art cited in the application is
less useful for invalidating a patent. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 234 (1998) (finding that
"[tihe probability of invalidity based on uncited art was 40.8%, while the probability of inva-
lidity based on cited art was 29.6%"); P. J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 1948-54, 38 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 233, 249 (1956) (finding that in forty cases where patents were rendered invalid,
only six involved references submitted by the applicant; the other thirty-four cases all involved
new prior art, and in half of these cases the new prior art directly led to invalidity); cf Kimber-
ly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 1538 (2003) ("Patents
that include more citations or more diverse citations are more likely to be valid.").
95. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc. 48 F.3d 1172, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("It is pre-
sumed that public officials do their assigned jobs." (quoting Northern Telecom, Inc. v.
Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); cf. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, 204 F.3d at
1367 ("When no prior art other than that which was considered by the PTO examiner is relied
on by the attacker, he has the added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a quali-
fied government agency presumed to have properly done its job, which includes one or more
examiners who are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the references and to be
familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it is to issue only
valid patents." (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 1984))). At the same time, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that this presump-
tion may be unrealistic: "The conclusion that [the examiner] was 'fully informed' rests solely
on the presentation to him of a mountain of largely irrelevant data from which he is presumed
to have been able, with his expertise and with adequate time, to have found the critical data. It
ignores the real world conditions under which examiners work." Rohm & Hass Co. v. Crystal
Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Real world examples further suggest the
presumption is unrealistic. In Synqor, for example, the examiner apparently considered over a
thousand prior art references for a patent application in a single day. Vicor Corp.'s Opposition
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examiners appear more likely to make a rejection based on prior art that
they find themselves than prior art submitted by the applicant.9 6 And, even if
the examiner does consider the buried reference, the applicant knows going
into the process that statistics favor the USPTO granting the patent.97 These
conditions suggest that burying a reference may have the same effect during
the application process as withholding the reference.
Given these considerations, an unscrupulous applicant unable to distin-
guish material prior art may have strong incentives to bury. Part II examines
the problems this behavior creates.
II. CosTs OF BURYING
When applicants bury material prior art, they impose costs on the
USPTO, parties trying patent infringement cases, and the general public.
This section considers each cost in turn.
A. Costs to the Patent Office
Courts, commentators, and the USPTO are all concerned with the
USPTO's efficiency.98 Burying creates significant inefficiencies at the
USPTO but nonetheless receives surprisingly little attention.
Burying material art with large amounts of immaterial prior art over-
burdens examiners. 99 Some courts assume that examiners will be able to
to Syqor's Motion to Dismiss, at 5, Synqor, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. I 1-cv-54, 2012 WL
3984865 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2012).
96. See Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implica-
tions for the Presumption of Validity 10-12 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No.
401, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568 (finding applicants submitted 74%
of the prior art references considered in patents, but examiners only used applicants' prior art
references to reject claims 13% of the time); see also Sampat, supra note 92, at 401
("[Aipplicants contribute a surprisingly low share of references to previous patents: on aver-
age, the majority of citations to previous patents come from examiners rather than applicants.
Applicants routinely fail to identify even their own previous patents, which suggests that, in
many cases, applicants do not conduct even cursory searches for prior art.").
97. Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L. J. 181, 182 (2008) (finding that applicants have a 75% success rate in obtaining patents
assuming that continuation of an abandoned application constitutes a single application).
98. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("[L]ow standards for intent and materiality have inadvertently led to
many unintended consequences, among them . . . strained PTO resources, increased PTO
backlog . . . ."); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1501 (2001); Robert Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577 (1999); see Office of Chief Economist, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/
index.jsp (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (describing the Office of the Chief Economist, one of the
goals of which is to reduce backlog at the USYTO).
99. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 770-72 (describing how this practice may lead to
information overload).
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handle such overdisclosure,'" but this assumption is seriously undermined
by available data. Both the number of applications filed per year has nearly
doubled in the last ten years' and the number of references disclosed per
application has increased steadily.10 2 But despite increases in the USPTO's
budget,1 3 the USPTO has not kept up: pending patent applications rose
more than 400% between 1997 and 2008.1'0 Examiners currently spend
around twenty hours per patent application, 05 and commentators argue that
this limited amount of time hinders the USPTO's ability to provide adequate
examination.106
Burying exacerbates the problem by creating enormous amounts of ad-
ditional reading for the examiner. Examiners not only have to deal with
large disclosures but also the possibility that material prior art was purpose-
fully hidden. If burying were prohibited, the size of disclosures would be
reduced, and examiners would have more time to review more applications,
increasing USPTO efficiency. Examiners might also put more stock in ap-
plicant-submitted references if applicants did not bury. For example, one
study suggests that examiners tend to use the results of their own prior art
searches in making decisions about patent applications, as opposed to
100. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
101. Compare U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTS (1999), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/1999/99patents.pdf (272,221 patent applications in
fiscal year 1999), with U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf (485,500 patent applica-
tion in fiscal year 2009).
102. See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Citing References to the USPTO, PATENTLY-
O (July 13, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/my-entry.html; see also Cotropia
et al., supra note 96 (noting anecdotal evidence of this and the diminished relevance of the
references).
103. Compare Summary of Financial and Performance Highlights, USPTO.cov (Jan.
14, 2011, 13:58 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/par_01.html
($1,436,432,000 in 2010), with Financial and Performance Highlights, USPTO.Gov (July 4,
2009, 1:36 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2005/01_summary.jsp
($1,240,798,000 in 2005), and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Consolidated Balance
Sheets, USPTO.GOv (Nov. 10, 2009, 2:27 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratptan/ar/2001/
04aconbalsheet.jsp ($1,072,594,000 in 2001).
104. See Gene Quinn, How to Fix the USPTO, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Nov. 21, 2008),
http://ipwatchdog.com/2008/11/21/how-to-fix-the-uspto/id=441/. Although the USPTO re-
ceives revenue from patent applications, Congress has apportioned some of these funds to
general federal funds. See Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1032-34 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(upholding the constitutionality of the apportionment scheme).
105. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (finding examiners usually spend no more than
twenty hours on a given application); Lemley, supra note 98, at 1500 (averaging eighteen
hours across studies).
106. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption
of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (2007) (recognizing burdens on USPTO); Lemley,
supra note 98, at 1497-500 (discussing costs of patent prosecution on USPTO).
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references cited by applicants.'o The study found that the likelihood an ap-
plicant-cited reference was used decreased as the number of applicant-cited
references, but the decrease was statistically insignificant. 0 8 This may be a
reaction to current disclosure practices by applicants, leading examiners to
ignore applicant-submitted art wholesale.109 Changes in applicant disclosure
behavior would allow examiners to put more trust in the disclosures appli-
cants submit, giving applicant-submitted materials greater weight during the
application process. This trust may reduce examiners' need to do their own
prior art searches and may further increase efficiency.
B. Costs to Litigants
Courts hold the most power to punish patentees who bury material prior
art. However, courts are reluctant to recognize burying as inequitable con-
duct, which in turn handicaps their ability to function as a forum for
policing patent quality. Not only does burying make litigation a less effec-
tive check on patent quality, it also makes litigation more expensive."10 All
else being equal, the cost to litigate a patent with a hundred references sub-
mitted by the applicant should be higher than the cost to litigate a patent
with ten references submitted by the applicant."' Although time might be
saved by having many prior art references already provided in the applica-
tion, if the buried reference is disclosed with numerous immaterial
references then little or no time is actually saved. Given the already high
costs of discovery in patent litigation, increased costs from buried prior art
is particularly problematic."12
107. See generally Cotropia et al., supra note 96.
108. Id. at 16.
109. Such an explanation is not inconsistent with the "examiner myopia" hypothesis put
forward in the paper. Id. at 29-30.
110. Patent infringement litigation is expensive. It costs an average of $2 million per
party when $1 million to $25 million is at risk. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incen-
tives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors
and Why Administrative Patent Office Review Might Help, 19 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004).
American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") estimates that the median cost of
litigation per side in a patent infringement lawsuit when $1 to $25 million is at stake is $2.5
million (more than $25 million at risk had a $5 million median). STEVEN M. AuVIL & DAVID
A. DIVINE, AIPLA REPORT OF THE EcONOMIC SURVEY 2011 (2011).
111. The Federal Circuit recognized that one effect of this excessive disclosure in patent
applications "increased adjudication cost and complexity" in courts. Therasense, Inc., v. Bec-
ton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
112. AIPLA has estimated that in 2001, the cost of litigating a patent through the discov-
ery stage was $1.5 million, with the total cost through the end of trial being $2.9 million. In
2005, these numbers increased to $3 million and $4.5 million, respectively. Neil A. Smith,
Complex Patent Suits: The Use of Special Masters for Claim Construction, 2 LANDSLIDE 36,
39 (2009).
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These problems will only get worse. As the number of applications in-
creases," 3 so does the amount of disclosure," 4 litigation," 5 and inequitable
conduct allegations."'6 This rise will likely continue despite the recent re-
forms to the inequitable conduct doctrine."' Furthermore, patents with
buried prior art may be litigated more often."' Such patents will likely in-
crease the already high costs of patent litigation,1 9 and these costs may
prevent private enforcers of patent quality from performing their function.120
C. Costs to the Public
The patent system is intended to balance the benefits of encouraging in-
novation with the costs of granting a limited monopoly on that innovation.12'
Granting patents that contain buried prior art disrupts this balance by gener-
ating higher costs than that of a properly issued patent, diminishing
innovation, and eroding public trust in the patent system. This section fo-
cuses on these costs.
113. See supra note 97.
114. See supra note 98.
115. Of course, one may not expect a one-to-one increase among the numbers of appli-
cants and disclosures: more patent applications does not necessarily mean more issued
patents, and more issued patents does not necessarily mean more patents worth litigating. Cf.
Allison & Lemley, supra note 94.
116. Inequitable conduct is pled in somewhere between 16-35% of reported patent liti-
gation opinions. See Mack, supra note 3. Many cases settle, however, so the number of times
inequitable conduct actually appears is probably much higher.
117. Cf Peng et al., supra note 75, at 387-90 (speculating that allegations of inequitable
conduct will remain the same after Therasense as many of the factors motivating alleged in-
fringers to claim inequitable conduct remain the same).
118. Patents with more cited references tend to be litigated more often; patents with
buried prior art, which would usually involve a large number of citations, may be more likely
to be litigated as well. Cf Lee Petherbridge et al., Unenforceability, (Univ. of Penn. Law Sch.,
Public Law Research Paper No. 12-28, 2012) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2167417 (litigated patents cite more references than unlitigated
patents); John Alison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-
Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) ("The most-litigated patents cite nearly
three times as many U.S. and foreign patents as other litigated patents and nearly ten times as
many nonpatent prior art references as other litigated patents. This is particularly notable giv-
en that litigated patents themselves cite much more prior art than unlitigated patents.");
Sampat, supra note 92 (applicants submit additional prior art for potentially more lucrative
patent applications).
119. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
120. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 110; Shubha Gosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents
Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance at the Patent Office, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1219, 1229
(2004). This may lead to the problems noted infra Part II.C. For other issues with using litiga-
tion as a private enforcement mechanism, see Katherine Zandy, Note, Too Much, Too Little, or
Just Right? A Goldilocks Approach to Patent Reexamination Reform, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 865, 869 (2006).
121. See Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 541 (2009).
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First, patents obtained through burying may increase litigation.122 Ap-
plicants that bury prior art know others may already be using similar
technology that could have anticipated the claims of the patent, and they
may use this to their advantage to sue as many parties as possible.123 These
in terrorem effects are particularly problematic because a patent issued with
buried prior art will likely not be found unenforceable for inequitable con-
duct. Additionally, the assumption that the examiner "considered" the prior
art makes it difficult to use the art to invalidate the patent.124 Thus, even
though the patent should not have been issued, it presents a credible
threat.'25 Because the plaintiff is asserting a patent with buried prior art that
should not have been issued, the defendant faces significant costs that could
have gone to research and development or other socially useful purposes.126
Such costs consequently may drive up prices of products and services.127
Litigation (and the possibility of an injunction) might not occur if the
patentee offers a sufficiently low license rate, a practice known as holdup
licensing.128 But even though licensing fees may cost less than litigation, the
result is still inefficient. And if potential licensees know the patent was is-
sued based on buried prior art, they will also know that a court is unlikely to
render the patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct, making them more
likely to settle and accept a license.129 To the extent the patent may still be
challenged on other grounds, any encouragement to settle is a cost in and of
itself where the patentee may continue to assert the patent against others.
Patents based on buried prior art can have anticompetitive and anti-
innovative effects. In general, issuance of a patent can block market entry in
122. See supra note 118.
123. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 106, at 48; see also Lemley, supra note 98, at
1515.
124. Certain Cold Cathode Fluorescent Lamp ("CCFL") Inverter Circuits, Inv. No. 337-
TA-666, USITC Pub. 4269 (Apr. 19, 2010) (initial determination).
125. See infra Part II1.B (regarding the burying doctrine).
126. SUSAN DESANTI ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5-6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; Lemley, supra note 98, at 1515.
127. Farrell & Merges, supra note 110, at 945; Megan La Belle, Patent Litigation, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 51 (2010).
128. Certain Cold Cathode Fluorescent Lamp ("CCFL") Inverter Circuits, Inv. No. 337-
TA-666, USITC Pub. 4269, at 5 (Apr. 19, 2010) (initial determination), available at 2010 WL
1918549 (citing Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx.
L. REV. 1991 (2007)); La Belle, supra note 127; Lemley, supra note 98, at 1515, 1517; Kristen
Osenaga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes-Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Con-
gestion in the Patent Office, 33 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 126 (2005); Edited & Excerpted
Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1053, 1126-27 (2004).
129. And perhaps less likely to render the patent invalid on any of the cited prior art,
since it was in fact cited. See supra note 94 (although the clear and convincing evidence
standard is the same for cited and non-cited art, previously cited prior art is often less success-
ful in invalidating a patent).
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some contexts. 30 When patentees are diligent in their enforcement, potential
entrants know they either have to litigate or get a license for technology that
is already known or obvious in the industry, increasing barriers to entry and
reducing competition.'3 ' This is a normal result of the patent system, but this
result becomes a problem in situations where the patent should never have
been granted, such as when it was issued over buried prior art. The effects of
granting such patents could disproportionately affect smaller businesses, as
they will have fewer resources to pay for the costs the patentee imposes on
them.' 32 Existing businesses may also be less inclined to develop down-
stream improvements on the type of technology the patent covers for fear of
infringement.'33 One could object that few businesses will be likely to drop
their product lines when they know the patent was obtained illicitly.' 4 And
even if the applicant did bury prior art, courts are unlikely to render the is-
sued patent unenforceable.'
Burying creates delays at the USPTO, which can have negative effects
on those outside the patent system. Since patent terms are calculated from
the time of filing rather than the time of issue, the more overburdened the
examiner, the longer a given patent will be stuck at the USPTO,13 6 and the
shorter the term the patent will have."' Delays in this process can conse-
quently stall creation of new jobs and products as obtaining a patent is often
130. As in the case of Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") approvals. See
Cotropia et al., supra note 96, at 5.
131. See David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation on the
Duty of Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S. TEx. L. REV.
205, 222 (2002); cf Lemley, supra note 98, at 1517.
132. Lemley, supra note 98, at 1516. Even if licenses or settlements are structured to
take into account the smaller entities' revenues, legal fees might not.
133. See Cotropia et al., supra note 96, at 5 (citing Colleen Chien, Of Trolls, Davids,
Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1571 (2009)); Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1085 (2008); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better
Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 769-70 (2002); Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Ineq-
uitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
147, 167 (2005).
134. Lemley, supra note 98, at 1516-17 ("Based on the advice of counsel, the company
might conceivably change its business plans, but the recipient's counsel will rarely advise such
a course of action when the patent is objectively invalid. Another possible reaction is to give in
without a fight. Some companies, especially small ones unsophisticated in patent law, may
simply drop their plans to sell a product once a patent is brought to their attention, without
even entering into a license negotiation. Again, though, this is an unusual reaction."); see, e.g.,
Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 20.
135. See supra Part I.C.
136. This is assuming the USPTO does not wish to reduce the quality of examination.
137. Osenaga, supra note 128, at 127-28. Note however that patent term adjustments
address this issue to some extent. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2011); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.702-703
(2012).
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a prerequisite for starting a new company or receiving funding.138 This in
turn can stall creation of new jobs and products.'39
Finally, burying reflects poorly on the patent system, eroding public
trust in it.14 0 For example, research investment may be chilled if chances are
high that the patent system will improperly impinge on the results of the
research. Public perception that "bad" patents are being granted may also
reduce support for the USPTO and diminish its ability to address these is-
sues.
To combat these heightened costs, the legal regime behind the patent
system must adjust to deter and punish burying. Patents issued on buried
prior art should be rendered unenforceable, and rules should be adopted to
prevent such patents from being issued in the first instance.
D. Counterarguments to Recognizing
Burying as Inequitable Conduct
Since burying can be seen as a special form of overdisclosure, some
courts have argued that prohibiting burying would trap practitioners such
that they either under or overdisclose.141 Either the applicant will not dis-
close the references and the patent will be unenforceable for nondisclosure,
or the applicant will disclose the references and the patent will mistakenly
be unenforceable for deceptive overdisclosure or burying. But this argument
fails to consider the ways in which the materiality and intent prongs of ineq-
uitable conduct work. A court would not find that an applicant buried prior
art if all the references were material, since burying generally involves hid-
ing a material reference under a mountain of immaterial references.142 in
addition, the clear and convincing evidence standard makes it unlikely that
courts will erroneously find that applicants intentionally submitted material
prior art with many immaterial references.
138. See Mack, supra note 3.
139. Edward Wyatt, U.S. Sets 21st-Century Goal: Building a Better Patent Office, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/business/21patent.html/.
140. Lemley argues that this is not the case, as low quality copyrights and trademarks
pass all the time but the system is still respected. See Lemley, supra note 98, at 1522-23.
However, patents are a different kind of intellectual property than copyright and require addi-
tional determinations of validity. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual
Property, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441 (2010).
141. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm. Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 329,
377-78 n.57 (D. Del. 2009) (noting the conflicting requirements between burying and nondis-
closure); Ex Parte Morning Surf Corp., 230 USPQ 446, 449 (B.P.A.I. 1982) ('The decision by
an applicant (or patentee) not to make such newly discovered references of record in the PTO
cannot be lightly made because of the seriousness of the consequences of a wrong decision.
On the other hand, to inundate the Examiner with a large volume of prior art that is not mate-
rial may obscure a single reference that is material and thus may be effectively as improper as
withholding a material reference.").
142. This argument assumes the litigation process will accurately determine whether or
not a reference is material.
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This argument also assumes that applicants will be unable to find a rea-
sonable middle ground between under and overdisclosure. This argument is
unconvincing; patent applicants in other contexts frequently make similar
discretionary decisions. For example, when drafting claims, applicants bal-
ance stating a claim as broadly as possible (to increase the scope of their
patent) with risking the patent application being indefinite or reading on
prior art. 143 Nor is this argument limited to patent agents and attorneys-
lawyers in other practices must make similar discretionary decisions,'" and
failing in these duties can have serious repercussions.14 5 It is unclear why
limiting burying disclosures would force applicants to either under or over-
disclose, when patent applicants and lawyers are already expected to make
similar discretionary decisions. Nonetheless, this essay proposes a solution
to specifically address this concern. 146
Other commentators argue that adding more forms of inequitable con-
duct will make litigation more expensive.147 But burying would not be
alleged in every case, and in those cases that it is alleged, it would only cre-
ate marginal additional costs. If a party were already in litigation for patent
infringement, then a defense of burying (which would likely be asserted
alongside other defenses) would be a relatively small additional expenditure.
This particularly would be the case if the alleged infringer argued that the
patent applicant engaged in inequitable conduct. Furthermore, any increase
in the cost of litigation by allowing a burying defense would likely be offset
by other costs reduced through discouraging burying.148 The availability of
the burying defense might also make the patentee more likely to settle in
certain cases, further reducing costs.
Nor would it be prohibitively difficult to prove the required degrees of
materiality and intent. In fact, materiality in burying contexts may be even
easier to establish than in nondisclosure contexts because burying necessarily
143. See 35 U.S.C. § 112,12 (2011); MPEP § 2171 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012).
144. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecutor's duty to disclose
material exculpatory evidence to the defendant); Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d
583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (party's duty to preserve material evidence); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (lawyer's duty to disclose false statements of material fact
previously made to a tribunal); see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d
1276, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (analogizing a patent applicant's duty to disclose
relevant prior art to disclosures for proxy solicitations in the securities context).
145. A Brady violation, for example, can lead to a conviction being overturned. Failures
in other such situations could, for example, lead to adverse evidentiary inferences or sanctions.
146. See infra Part III.B.
147. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law's Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY ThcH. L. 723, 782 (2009) ("Declining to expand the duties under the
doctrine would also keep litigation costs down. The more theories of liability under the doc-
trine, the more opportunities for an alleged infringer to assert the defense of inequitable
conduct. As the duties under the doctrine increase, the easier it becomes for a defendant to find
at least one plausible theory of inequitable conduct. The defendant is also able to keep the
claim alive longer during litigation.")
148. See infra Part IlI.B.
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entails submitting material prior art. By contrast, in situations involving
withheld prior art, one might argue that the prior art was withheld because it
was not material (assuming the prior art is even known to the applicant).
Additionally, in the nondisclosure-based inequitable conduct case, the appli-
cant might not have disclosed a particular reference because they actually
thought it was not important. Therefore in cases where the reference was
submitted, there is less of an argument that the reference is not material: the
applicant's submission of the reference suggests that the reference at least
could be material, because otherwise the applicant is claiming they provided
the USPTO with references they believe to be unimportant or irrelevant.149
Thus, in theory, materiality should not be more difficult to prove for buried
references than for withheld references. Even so, there remains one very
large hurdle for the materiality prong: current Federal Circuit precedent
does not consider a reference material for inequitable conduct if the refer-
ence was before the examiner.i5 0 Overcoming this hurdle requires proving
the examiner did not actually read the reference, which is difficult when
courts frequently and incorrectly presume examiners always read refer-
ences. '5
One could also argue that it will be impossible to provide clear and con-
vincing evidence of an intent to deceive. But many of the same arguments
regarding proof of materiality apply here as well. First, burying is an affirm-
ative act, and submitting a presumably material reference with many other
presumably immaterial references may provide a record from which to find
deceptive intent.152 And even if burying were very difficult to prove, the
harshness of the inequitable conduct remedy suggests that deterrence would
nonetheless be effective.'
Finally, although one could criticize calls for reform that are not
grounded in empirical evidence, making an accurate empirical determina-
tion of how often applicants deceptively bury prior art would be difficult.
The reason is closely related to why burying (and inequitable conduct gen-
erally) is difficult to prove: one cannot make the determination simply by
looking at the face of the patent or the number of references disclosed. If
this were the case, there would not be protracted litigation on the matter.
Instead, at best, these indicia provide circumstantial evidence of burying.
149. To err on the side of caution, applicants might indiscriminately disclose the same
set of art for similar patent applications. In such cases, issues of materiality would rightly be
questioned, since this is not a form of burying material prior art, simply overdisclosure.
150. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 90 (stating the assumptions courts make); see also infra Part Ill.B
(explaining why these assumptions are incorrect). Note that examiners are only allowed to
testify on an extremely limited basis. See MPEP § 1701.01 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) (col-
lecting cases).
152. But see Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F3d 1276, 1313 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (questioning whether withholding a reference is
not in fact an affirmative act).
153. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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For example, one could compare the number of references cited in the pa-
tent with some baseline reasonable number of references.154 But even if the
baseline were accurate, comparing disclosures to a baseline would not tell
the whole story. For example, an applicant might disclose a large number of
references to the USPTO in good faith, without trying to bury a particular
reference. Or an applicant might attempt to bury a reference in a relatively
small number of references, especially if the goal is simply to mischaracter-
ize the material reference.15 Other indicators that could be useful but not
definitive include whether explanations of the references were given or
when the disclosure was made."' But even if they were definitive, the costs
of evaluating such factors may not make them practical for empirical study.
While it may be difficult to quantify burying empirically, litigation over
burying does appear to be increasing.15 7 And if the practice is becoming
more widespread, we can expect the costs associated with it to rise as well.
154. One potential baseline could be twenty references. Twenty is the average number of
references cited in a patent, see Crouch & Rantanen, supra note 102, the apparent tipping
point for overloading examiners, see Dennis Crouch, Evidence Based Prosecutions: Non-
Patent Prior Art Leads to Rejections, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Oct. 29, 2006), http://www.
patentlyo.com/patent/2006/1 0/evidencebased 3.html, and the cutoff proposed by the
USPTO for requiring additional explanation for disclosed references. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text. Some flexibility could be added by having the baseline depend on the
technology at issue. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 778 n. 285.
155. See, e.g., Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 765 F. Supp. 1129, 1137-38
(D. Conn. 1991); Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948, 964-65 (D.
Fla. 1972) (referencing material submitted with twelve other references in an attempt to mis-
characterize a material reference that was inequitable conduct); see also supra notes 43-48
and accompanying text.
156. Large disclosures made during the initial filing should theoretically be the least
suspicious because applicants disclose most prior art in the initial filing. See Lemley, supra
note 98, at 18 (finding that only 23% of applicant-submitted references are submitted after the
filing). Once an examiner no longer has any bases for rejection and the patent is set to issue,
the applicant might have far more incentives to bury. Because the patent was already expected
to issue and subsequent applications will be piling up for the examiner, the applicant may feel
confident that the examiner will give less attention to the disclosed references at this point.
Anecdotally, the caselaw confirms that some applicants try to bury references later in the ap-
plication process. See, e.g., Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Shanghai Meihao Elec., Inc., 613 F.
Supp. 2d 670, 713 (D. Md. 2009) (finding disclosure during appeal of material reference along
with hundreds of other references "suggest[s] bad, not good, faith" and finding inequitable
conduct in part on these grounds), vacated sub nom, Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Universal Sec.
Instruments, Inc., 606 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (remanding on question of intent).
157. Though the paper does not claim to have found every published case on burying,
nearly all of the cases the Article did find are from the last ten years, particularly the last five.
Industry publications are beginning to appear on the topic as well. See, e.g., 4 ROBERT A.
MATTHEWS, ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 27:26 (2011); Joseph A. Saltiel & Duan Fu, Is
Burying a Material Reference Inequitable Conduct?, JENNER & BLOCK (July 16, 2010),
http://www.jenner.com/systemlassets/assets/4524/original/Is-BuryingA-MaterialReference
InequitableConduct.pdf.
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III. SOLUTIONS
This Part proposes ways to deter and punish burying. Much like Part I,
the discussion is divided between the USPTO and the courts. The aim in
both sections is to find ways to regulate burying such that the costs of pro-
hibiting burying do not exceed the costs the practice creates.
A. For the Patent Office
Some commentators have suggested that the USPTO is a more appro-
priate venue than courts to address issues with the patent system. For
example, effective enforcement through litigation may be marred by skewed
incentives and monetary imbalances between the parties.'58 Judges and ju-
ries may also have difficulty following the technical nature of the patent
claims, making it harder for courts to create sound patent policy.159 To the
extent the USPTO does not have these problems, changing USPTO rules
would be the preferable way to address burying.
One potential change to USPTO rules involves modifying the require-
ments for submitting references. Rule 11.1 8(b)(2) requires an applicant to
make a "reasonable inquiry" into the content of a patent submission. One
interpretation of this rule is that it requires that applicants actually read the
information they submit.o60 If an applicant reads every reference and makes
a truly reasonable inquiry (more than just skimming), then it is less likely
that an applicant would submit IDSs with hundreds of references.' 6 ' But
since it is not easy to prove that an applicant made a reasonable inquiry or
fully read each reference, this rule may be difficult to enforce. Alternately,
each applicant could be required to highlight the most important references
in their submission. MPEP § 2004.13 already suggests this approach.162 But
even if highlighting the most important references were required, this still
might not be effective as the applicant would be determining what to high-
light and, absent some upper bound, the applicant would likely err on the
side of over-highlighting.
158. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 110, at 951-60 (suggesting litigation may not be
an effective ex-post mechanism because, for example, parties are not always on equal footing
financially and do not always have the same amount at stake).
159. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 106, at 67-68.
160. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
161. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 778 ("Rule 10.18(b)(2) [now I l.18(b)(2)] requires
patent attorneys to make an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" as to why a paper is
submitted . .. . Enforcement of this rule would temper the amount of low-cost overcompli-
ance.").
162. See MPEP § 2004.13 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) ("It is desirable to avoid the sub-
mission of long lists of documents if it can be avoided. Eliminate clearly irrelevant and
marginally pertinent cumulative information. If a long list is submitted, highlight those docu-
ments which have been specifically brought to applicant's attention and/or are known to be of
most significance."). It is unclear what, if anything, happens if an applicant does not follow the
suggestion.
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A broader, and perhaps more difficult, modification would be to change
what each applicant is required to submit. This would involve changing Rule
1.56, which governs the standard of materiality for applicant disclosures.
Currently, Rule 1.56 encourages the submission of large numbers of ques-
tionably material references.163 Tightening the standard of materiality might
therefore discourage burying by discouraging applicants from submitting
excessive references." A higher materiality standard would also make it
more likely that unimportant references disclosed through burying would
not be found material.
Given these considerations, we turn to Rule 1.56. The rule currently
states that "[i]nformation is material [if it creates] a prima facie case of un-
patentability .... A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when
the information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable [via] pre-
ponderance of evidence . . . ." One solution may be to raise the standard to
that recently adopted by the Federal Circuit in Therasense.165
Tightening the materiality standard at the USPTO, however, is not with-
out problems. First, it may encourage applicants to withhold relevant prior
art. And though the USPTO currently faces a problem of overdisclosure,
changing the standard may tip the scales back towards underdisclosure. Fi-
nally, the duty of candor envisioned by the rule might arguably be enough to
cover burying as is.166 This Essay therefore proposes changes to the materi-
ality standard for the inequitable conduct doctrine instead, in a subsequent
section below.167
The USPTO could also enact entirely new rules. One possibility is to
require applicants to provide a brief summary of each reference in the patent
application.168 Currently such summaries are required only for foreign lan-
guage references, but if the rule were applied to English language
references, burying would be prohibitively costly for many applicants. The
summaries of the disclosed prior art should help USPTO examiners save
time. More practical and fewer overall submissions may also help examiners
163. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012).
164. Cf Peters, supra note 3, at 1547, 1557-65 (arguing that the standard of Rule 1.56 is
superior to the old standard as it is narrower, and so mitigates information overload). But see
Cotropia, supra note 3, at 779 (arguing that a narrow standard of materiality would make the
inequitable conduct doctrine redundant in patent litigation).
165. See supra Part 1.B.I.
166. See Sean M. O'Connor, Defusing the "Atomic Bomb" of Patent Litigation: Avoid-
ing and Defending Against Allegations of Inequitable Conduct After McKesson et al., 9 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PRop. 330, 348 (2010) ("[Ciurrent calls for patent applicants and
their attorneys to simply disclose every imaginable reference ... may well violate Rule 56 as
much as a failure to disclose a material reference."); Peters, supra note 3, at 1557-62; see also
Ex Parte Morning Surf Corp., 230 USPQ 446, 449 (B.P.A.I. 1982) ("[T]o inundate the Exam-
iner with a large volume of prior art that is not material may obscure a single reference that is
material and thus may be effectively as improper as withholding a material reference.").
167. See infra Part 111.13.
168. The USPTO used to require this before changing the rule in 1992. See Duty of
Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021-02 (proposed Jan. 17, 1992).
Burying 125Fall 2012]
126 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
trust applicant-submitted prior art. While these additional rules would lead
to more costs borne by applicants, such costs should be imposed on appli-
cants instead of the greater public-it is, after all, the applicant's patent.
Examiners at the USPTO also face an informational asymmetry relative to
applicants, making applicants the least cost provider of such information.'"9
The USPTO previously tried and failed to establish a requirement that
applicants provide explanations for how certain prior art affects patentabil-
ity, but the proposal in this Essay is not so demanding. By contrast, the
proposal here would only require that references be summarized, which is
arguably a lesser liability-inducing activity than requiring actual explana-
tions of how each reference affects patentability. 70 If actual explanations
were required, they might be so expensive as to discourage even proper dis-
closures.171 And examiners may also become overloaded if they have too
many references before them.172 Though summarizing references may pre-
sent similar problems, the problems would be of a lesser magnitude.
Another possible rule would involve sliding scale fees for disclosures. 73
Currently, submitting an IDS entails a fixed cost of $180, regardless of how
many references are included.174 Applicants could instead be charged a slid-
ing scale fee based on the number of documents disclosed. After a certain
minimum number of "free" references,' 75 additional references would cost
money to disclose. The fee could go up, perhaps exponentially, upon
meeting certain thresholds in order to make it more effective. What these
thresholds should be is a difficult question, however. Ideally the threshold
and the fee would make burying cost prohibitive for at least some appli-
cants. In situations where the applicants still choose to bury, the fees
generated should in theory increase the revenue of the USPTO, and allow it
169. Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office:
Refraining the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 90, 136 (2011) ("Nevertheless, significantly reducing the penalties for failing to dis-
close references would effectively shift the duty to locate these references to the USPTO. Such
a reallocation of responsibility would seem markedly inefficient in view of the information
asymmetries that often exist between applicants and the USPTO."); Bhaven N. Sampat, De-
terminants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAUCOLUMBlA/
C050902S.pdf ("Using these data, I find strong evidence that patent examiners have a compar-
ative disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior art and foreign patents, suggesting that all
else equal, patents are likely to be of lower quality for technological areas for which most
prior art is not embodied in U.S. Patents.").
170. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
171. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 780 ("Relevancy statements, which require the appli-
cant to identify the relevant portions of the submitted information and distinguish the
disclosed invention ... [range] from $12,250 to $20,000.").
172. Id. at 770-71, 781.
173. An alternative might involve simply capping the size of the information disclosure.
174. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(p) (2012). In this sense applicants are only limited by what their
patent agent bills them.
175. Perhaps twenty. Cf supra note 154.
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to parse through such disclosures more effectively. This sliding scale solu-
tion would also balance the playing field for smaller companies, since such
companies might lack the resources to blanket the USPTO with unnecessary
references.176 Implementing a separate small entity fee schedule for infor-
mation disclosures could make the application process fairer still.177
Requiring applicants to provide a brief summary of each reference and
implementing a sliding scale fee schedule based on the number of disclo-
sures are two of the simplest and most effective ways to deter burying at the
USPTO. Although tightening the materiality standard under Rule 1.56 to
require clear and convincing evidence could also deter burying, changes to
materiality standards may be better left for the inequitable conduct doctrine.
B. For Courts
While some commentators have argued that the expertise of the USPTO
makes it better equipped to police patent quality,7 8 others suggest that the
USPTO only provides a "first pass," and instead litigation between private
parties provides a more effective mechanism.' 79 But in order for courts to
address burying, the practice must first be recognized as inequitable con-
duct.
As a preliminary matter, burying involves a different form of deceit than
traditional inequitable conduct: buried references are actually disclosed as
opposed to intentionally withheld. This difference suggests the need for dif-
ferent or even new rules regarding inequitable conduct. As an example,
consider the following rule from Scripps: "[W]hen a reference was before
the examiner, whether through the examiner's search or the applicant's dis-
closure, it can not be deemed to have been withheld."o80 The rule, which is
problematic in many respects,'"' relies on an assumption that makes it inap-
176. But see Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Patent Citation Networks Revisited: Signs of
a Twenty-First Century Change?, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1696 fig.17 (2009) (finding only a
small increase in frequency of mass citations in patents for companies that hold many patents
as opposed to companies holding few patents).
177. IDSs currently do not have a small fee schedule. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.17(p), 1.27
(2012).
178. See supra note 155.
179. See generally Lemley, supra note 98. Litigation leads to more time being focused
on patents that matter, and litigation allows a closer look at the patent than the normal examin-
er can provide. Cf. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 106, at 47 (discussing why courts may be
better equipped to determine validity than the USPTO). In addition, creating a flawless patent
office, even if possible, would be immensely expensive. Lemley, supra note 98, at 1497. And
there is evidence to suggest that the inequitable conduct doctrine can and does affect applicant
incentives. See Petherbridge et al., supra note 18, at 24-26.
180. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
181. For example, "[t]he conclusion that [the examiner] was 'fully informed' rests solely
on the presentation to him of a mountain of largely irrelevant data from which he is presumed
to have been able, with his expertise and with adequate time, to have found the critical data. It
ignores the real world conditions under which examiners work." Rohm & Hass Co. v. Crystal
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plicable to burying. In particular, the rule assumes that an applicant would
only attempt to deceive the USPTO via nondisclosure, and thus in those
cases the only way the examiner would have the reference is if the examiner
discovered it himself. 8 2 This assumption falls apart in situations where the
applicant attempted to deceive the USPTO by burying the prior art. In such
cases, although the relevant prior art is formally before the examiner, the
examiner will not necessarily have considered it on account of the appli-
cant's flooding the examiner with countless other references. Thus, limits on
inequitable conduct based off the rule from Scripps would not make sense
for burying.
In addition, the tension between preventing nondisclosure and prevent-
ing overdisclosure-a problem not unique to burying-must be accounted
for. Striking the right balance with a single standard of materiality may not
be possible. Instead, two separate materiality standards-one for deceptive
overdisclosure, such as burying, and one for withholding references-would
be more appropriate.
For deceptive overdisclosure (i.e., burying), a relatively high standard of
materiality is needed. The court in Therasense essentially recognized this by
raising the standard of materiality in response to the proliferation of inequi-
table conduct charges and the related problem of overdisclosure at the
USPTO.183 A higher materiality standard would limit the number of refer-
ences deemed material to patentability and in turn discourage the massive
disclosures that generally accompany attempts to bury. By contrast, for de-
ceptive nondisclosure, a relatively low standard of materiality would be
most effective. A relatively low materiality standard would encourage appli-
cants to submit reasonably important references without creating undue fear
of inequitable conduct charges.
As to what the materiality standards should actually be, the "but-for"
standard from Therasense provides a starting point for deceptive overdisclo-
sure by burying. Under the Therasense standard, a reference is material if an
examiner would not have allowed the application in light of the reference.184
Therasense itself noted the related problem of overdisclosure, and it would
certainly make sense that applicants need not disclose a reference that would
not affect the validity of the claims applied for. The materiality standard
Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). More specifically, however, the rule does
not punish applicants who attempted to deceive the USPTO but failed. Contrast this with crim-
inal law, where an attempt is punished similarly to commission of the crime. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAw §§ 110.00, 110.05 (2012). Note too that applicants used to face punishment for
attempting to deceive the USPTO. See Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants on Fire: Towards a
Narrow Construction for Inequitable Conduct as Applied to the Prosecution of Medical De-
vice and Drug Patent Applications, 72 UMKC L. REv. 669, 716 (2004).
182. Indeed, this was the situation in Scripps. See supra Part I.B.2.
183. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285, 1289-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
184. See id. at 1291.
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from Therasense is therefore suitable to help prevent and punish burying.
For nondisclosure, however, the current USPTO standard-which the court
in Therasense recognizes as broader than the one it adopted'85-would be
more appropriate.' 86 The USPTO's standard has gone through multiple itera-
tions and has generally proven useful in preventing applicants from
withholding material prior art. Together, these two standards provide rea-
sonable, fair tests for to find a reference either improperly withheld or
buried.
While separate standards make sense for materiality, a single standard
for intent remains appropriate. First, the trapping argument does not apply in
this context-either the applicant did or did not intend to deceive the
USPTO. Second, there is no reason to think that deceptive overdisclosure by
burying should be any more or less culpable than deceptive nondisclosure.
Both involve deceitful conduct, and as such the appropriate inquiry for both
is whether there was an intent to deceive.
The most critical change needed to the inequitable conduct doctrine is
to make the intent prong properly account for burying. The current standard
is clear and convincing evidence of intent to deceive. 187 However, under that
standard, evidence of intent to bury is not necessarily evidence of intent to
deceive, meaning burying generally does not meet the current intent prong
of inequitable conduct.'88 The simple solution is that burying alone, without
other bad faith conduct, should suffice to satisfy the intent prong of inequi-
table conduct.'18  Courts have generally shied away from such a strong
application of inequitable conduct to burying, but this must change. And in
cases where evidence of burying is too weak to meet the clear and convincing
evidence standard or the applicant's action was not so clearly deceptive, the
185. See id. at 1294-95.
186. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992); supra Part I.A.
187. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.
188. See supra Part I.B.
189. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 778 ("[T]he intentional submission of immaterial or
cumulative information should be actionable under the doctrine. . . . [This would reach] those
who are truly trying to bury the examiner with information they know is irrelevant."). Another
possibility is that mischaracterization of references through burying could constitute inequita-
ble conduct by itself, but other forms of burying could be only probative of bad faith. For an
example of such mischaracterization, see Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F.
Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Some commentators disagree, arguing that the inequitable con-
duct doctrine should only serve to make the patent system work and not inject a moral
element. See David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 945, 980 (2010).
But if deceptive behavior is used to break rules that are designed to make the patent system
work, the morality of applicants' actions is a relevant consideration. The Federal Circuit rec-
ognizes this with an exception to the materiality prong for "affirmative egregious misconduct."
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292 ("Although but-for materiality generally must be proved to satis-
fy the materiality prong of inequitable conduct, this court recognizes an exception in cases of
affirmative egregious misconduct. This exception to the general rule requiring but-for proof
incorporates elements of the early unclean hands cases before the Supreme Court, which dealt
with 'deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme[s]' to defraud the PTO and the
courts." (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944))).
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evidence could nonetheless be probative of bad faith.190 Without these changes
courts will continue to lack the appropriate tools to address burying.
CONCLUSION
Burying imposes unnecessary costs on the patent system and the public.
Deficiencies in both USPTO rulemaking and the inequitable conduct doc-
trine currently allow applicants to bury prior art with impunity. This Essay
has attempted to take a comprehensive look at the practice and has posited a
variety of solutions, including requiring applicants to summarize references,
implementing sliding scale fees for submitting references, allowing
references before the examiner to serve as a basis for inequitable conduct,
creating separate standards of materiality for buried references and withheld
references, and adjusting the deceptive intent prong to accommodate allega-
tions of burying. Implementing these suggestions would help prevent
applicants from burying prior art and alleviate the problems created by the
practice.
190. Cf Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding bury-
ing may be probative of bad faith).
[Vol. 19:99
